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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES
Appellants' list of the parties to the trial court proceeding is complete and
accurate; Kristin and Dean Mackey (hereinafter "Mackeys") adopt Appellants' list.
STATEMENTS SHOWING JURISDICTION, ISSUES PRESENTED,
AND DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
Appellants' statements related to jurisdiction, issues presented for appellate
review, and the determinative legal provisions are accurate and complete. Appellees do
not dispute the standards of review and legal standards that Appellants set forth for each
discrete appellate issue. Appellees adopt the content of each respective section.
STATEMENT OFFACTS RELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL
1. On August 4, 2005, Kristin Mackey purchased approximately 49 acres of land in
Hobble Creek Canyon; the land was divided by a road (33 acres west of the road and 16
acres east of the road). (R. 231.)
2. In 2005, Plaintiff Leslie Mower ("Mower") "wanted to purchase enough property
in Hobble Creek Canyon for a horse ranch and equestrian center." (R. 229.)
3. In order to assemble enough contiguous property for the ranch, Ms. Mower's nowvJ

deceased husband Kenneth Doleszar ("Doleszar") worked together with Appellee David
Simpson ("Simpson") to negotiate and broker land transactions. (R. 229.)
4. As Ms. Mower admitted in her own deposition (and Mr. Simpson confirmed in his
deposition), Mr. Simpson was not acting as a real estate agent for Doleszar, Mower, or
any of Mower's entities. (R. 229.)

I
~
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5. In fact, Mr. Simpson never communicated with Ms. Mower about the acquisition
and purchase of any of the properties that were ultimately assembled, swapped, or
acquired for the ranch. (R. 229.)
6. At least four different parcels of property (the Crandall, Storrs, Olsen, and
Thornhill parcels) were purchased by companies that Mr. Simpson had created to
ultimately assemble the property required for Ms. Mower's desired ranch. (R. 229-231.)
7. As part of the process of assembling the property for the desired ranch, Ms.
Mackey transferred a Right of Use Easement to 4.5 acres of her property and entered into
a contract (the Reconveyance Agreement) to transfer 12-14 acres of her property to one
of the companies that Mr. Simpson had created to assemble the properties for the ranch;
in exchange for these transfers, Ms. Mackey received enough property from the Storrs
and Olsen parcels of property to create one contiguous parcel (so that she could secure a
building permit and construct a house). (R. 231-232, 398.)
8. As part of her agreement to transfer the 12-14 acres, Ms. Mackey signed a
Reconveyance Agreement; that Reconveyance Agreement remains in effect today. (R.
232-233, 250, 273.)
9. The transactions occurred on the following dates:
a. Storrs parcel: purchased on February 15, 2006 and deeded to Ms. Mackey
on August 24, 2006. (R. 230-232.)
b. Olsen parcel: purchased on July 3, 2006 and deeded to Ms. Mackey on
August 24, 2006. (R. 230-232.)
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c. Thornhill parcel: purchased through three separate transactions (cash
payment, a land transfer (the Crandall parcel), and the Right of Use
Easement) that occurred between April and August 2006. (R. 230-233.)
10. In 2006, after the properties had been acquired, Ms. Mower visited and walked the
property that was to be used for her ranch. (R. 401.)
11. Ultimately, Ms. Mower constructed her ranch and equestrian center. (R. 233.)
12. During the time that Ms. Mackey and her husband Dean Mackey worked with Mr.
Simpson to facilitate the land transfers, the Mackeys were not aware of any specific
agency or fiduciary relationship that Mr. Simpson had with Ms. Mower (or any of the
Appellants); they were also not aware of any duties that Mr. Simpson owed to Ms.
Mower (or any of the Appellants). (R. 399.)
13. Furthermore, the Mackeys were never informed, and never had any knowledge of,
any breach of any duty that Mr. Simpson owed to Ms. Mower or any of the Appellants.
(R. 399.)
14. All of the funds used to pay for the purchase of the Storrs, Olsen, Crandall, and
Thornhill properties (all of which were ultimately purchased and used to facilitate and
finalize the transfers required to secure land for Ms. Mower's ranch) came from a joint
banking account owned and accessible by "Leslie D. Mower or Kenneth G. Doleszar."
(R. 400.)

15. Furthermore, Ms. Mower was aware that the account was being used to purchase
property; she saw a $2 million cashier's check (that was negotiated by Mr. Simpson on
December 20, 2005) come out of her bank account. (R. 400.)
3
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16. Appellants filed their Complaint on November 10, 201 O; in the Complaint, they
set forth the following claims against the Mac keys: Aiding and Abetting Breach of
Fiduciary Duty, Conspiracy, Unjust Enrichment, Constructive Trust, Equitable Lien, and
Breach of Contract.
17. The Breach of Contract claim was based on an alleged breach of the
Reconveyance Agreement; however, that claim was dismissed by stipulation and without
prejudice, on October 9, 2014. 1 (R. 974-976.)
SUMMARY OF MACKEYS' ARGUMENT
Appellants' claims were untimely and appropriately dismissed by the trial court.
Appellants have not and cannot demonstrate any admissible facts that provide any
entitlement to the tolling of any of the applicable statute of limitations period (four
years). Appellants were unable to meet the burden required at the trial court level to
establish that the Mackeys fraudulently concealed their claims from Mower; Appellants
have not even attempted to address that deficiency in their opening Brief, and Appellants
have presented no evidence or analysis in their Brief that even comes close to triggering
the statutory or equitable discovery rules
{,,,

li;;.,·

The law of the case was properly and appropriately applied. The trial court's
reliance upon the law of the case as one of the bases for dismissing the Appellants'
claims against the Mackeys (as untimely) was proper.
Appellants have completely failed to address and analyze the alternative bases
(other than statute of limitations) that supported the trial court's dismissal of Appellants'
1

The Breach of Contract claim and its dismissal are not at issue in this appeal.
4
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claims against the Mackeys. Appellants have provided no basis for this Court to overturn
the trial court's dismissal of the claim that the Mackeys aided and abetted Mr. Simpson's
alleged breach of fiduciary duties (which was also dismissed because Appellants never
provided any evidence that the Mackeys had any knowledge that Mr. Simpson owed or
breached any duties to Appellants). Appellants have provided no basis for this Court to
overturn the trial court's dismissal of Appellants' claim that the Mackeys were unjustly
enriched (which was also dismissed because it was undisputed that the Mackeys provided
consideration in exchange for the property that they received). Finally, Appellants have
provided no basis for this Court to overturn the trial court's dismissal of Appellants'
claim that the Mackeys were co-conspirators with Mr. Simpson and his entities (which
was also dismissed due to Appellants' lack of evidence that the Mackeys engaged in any
unlawful act).
ARGUMENT
Before analyzing the numerous substantive deficiencies within Appellants'
arguments, it is important to note that it cannot be disputed that Appellants received the
benefit of their bargain (the land upon which to construct the ranch and equestrian center)
and that they continue to enjoy the benefits to this day (the ranch and equestrian center
remain, and Appellants retain ownership). Somehow, Appellants believe that they are
entitled to maintain the significant and lasting benefit of the very transactions that they
seek to repudiate. Their claims have always been specious, unsupported, and illogical.
Their Appellate Brief is no different, and it certainly does not identify any reason to
overturn any aspect of the trial court's dismissal of Appellants' claims as a matter oflaw.
5
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I. APPELLANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO TOLLING AND THEIR CLAI1\1S
AGAINST THE MACKEYS WERE UNTIMELY.

Appellants' assertion that their claims were not untimely is deficient in many
respects, especially as that assertion applies to claims against the Mackeys. First,
Appellants cannot rely upon the statutory discovery rule (as the rule does not apply to the
claims asserted against the Mackeys) or the equitable tolling doctrine. Appellants did not
even attempt to demonstrate that they met the necessary elements to rely upon the
equitable tolling doctrine or explain why they were not on constructive notice of the
transactions. Also, Appellants have not demonstrated that the Mackeys were involved in
any concealment and, therefore, cannot seek to toll their claims against the Mackeys in
any event.

A. The Appellants were not entitled to rely on the equitable discove,y rule.
The trial court correctly determined that the Appellants' aiding and abetting a
breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and conspiracy claims were barred by the
statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for the claims of breach of fiduciary
duties, unjust enrichment, and conspiracy is four years. Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-307; see

also Russell/Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, if 11, 78 P.3d 616. In other
words, a plaintiff's claims for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment, and conspiracy are barred if brought after four years from the happening of
the last event necessary to complete the cause of action. In Utah, "[a]s a general rule, a
statute of limitations begins to run upon the happening of the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action"; also, "[o]nee a statute has begun to run, a plaintiff must

6
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file his or her claim before the limitations period expires or the claim will be barred."
Russell/Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ,I 20, 108 P. 3d 741 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). It is important to note that "[m]ere ignorance of
the existence of a cause of action will neither prevent the running of the statute of
limitations nor excuse a plaintiffs failure to file a claim within the relevant statutory
period." Id.
The above-stated rule applies to all claims that any plaintiff could make against a
defendant unless one of two narrow exceptions applies (which would toll the
commencement of a statutory limitations period "until the discovery of facts fonning the
basis for the cause of action."). Id. at ,I 21. The first exception is what the Utah Supreme
Court has labeled the "statutory discovery rule." Id. This exception applies only when "a
relevant statute of limitations, by its own terms, mandates application of the discovery
rule." Id. None of Appellants' claims against the Mackeys qualify for this exception, so it
does not apply.
The second exception to application of a statutory limitations period is the
"equitable discovery rule." Id. at ,I 24. Tolling of a limitations period under this exception
only occurs "when either exceptional circumstances or the defendant's fraudulent
concealment prevents the plaintiff from timely filing suit." Colosimo v. Roman Catholic
Bishop, 2007 UT 25, ,I 15, 156 P.3d 806. For this exception even to apply, "an initial
showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know and could not reasonably have
discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action within
the limitations period." Id. at ,I 19 (internal quotations and citations omitted). This
7
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showing is not cursory, and "courts should be cautious in tolling a statute of limitations,"
for "liberal tolling could potentially cause greater hardships than it would ultimately
relieve." Beaver County v. Property Tax Div. of Utah State Tax Comm., 2006 UT 6,, 32,
128 P. 3d 1187. Certainly, "equitable tolling should not be used simply to rescue litigants
who have inexcusably and unreasonably slept on their rights." Id.
In this case, the Plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary
duty, unjust enrichment, and conspiracy are untimely, and Appellants completely failed
to present any evidence that the equitable discovery rule should apply to toll the
limitations period on their claims against the Mackeys. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on
November 10, 2010, which is more than four years after the last transaction that involved
the Mackeys (the Thornhill closing, which occurred in August 2006). The last actions
necessary to complete aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and
unjust enrichment occurred more than four years prior to the filing of this suit. Therefore,
these causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs cannot claim that the equitable discovery rule prevents the
application of the four-year statute of limitations. Ms. Mower had actual notice, record
notice, and constructive knowledge of the transactions. She was aware of these property
transactions purchases when, or very soon after, they occurred; she visited her new
agglomerated property in Hobble Creek Canyon in 2006. The conveyance documents
were recorded and gave notice to each Plaintiff (and the world) of each transaction long
before any purported lie by Mr. Simpson. Additionally, the funds for the properties came
from Ms. Mower's joint account (she had complete access and ability to inquire into
8
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where her funds were going at the time) and she stated she knew about a $2 million check
dated December 20, 2005 that came out of her account.
Appellants' sole argument against the imposition of the four-year statute of
limitations is the unsupported assertion that Mr. Simpson and Mr. Doleszar engaged in
fraudulent concealment. However, Appellants ignored the first requirement of the tolling
provision-the prima facie showing that fraudulent concealment occurred. Because
Appellants never established a prima facie case for fraudulent concealment, when they
found out or should have found out about their claims is absolutely irrelevant.
In Berenda v. Langford, the Utah Supreme Court clearly and specifically set forth that a
"plaintiff can avoid the full operation of the discovery rule by making a prima facie
showing of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrating that given the defendant's
actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the claim earlier." 914 P.2d 45,
51 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added).2 Later in the same case, the Supreme Court reiterated
this requirement, stating that "a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of fraudulent
concealment" before demonstrating that she could not have discovered the claim earlier.

Id. at 54 (emphasis added). In Colosimo, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that a
plaintiff that fails "to allege any affirmative acts of concealment" has no ability to seek
equitable tolling. 2007 UT 25, ,r 45. Clearly, unless a plaintiff actually sets forth a prima

2

In Yazd v. Woodside Home Co,p., the Utah Supreme Court identified "[t]he three
elements of fraudulent concealment ... ( 1) there is a legal duty to communicate
information, (2) the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose,
and (3) the nondisclosed information is material." 2006 UT 47, ,r 35, 143 P.3d 283; see
also Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. v. Low,y, 2010 UT App 113, ,r 16, n.15, 233 P .3d
538.
9
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facie case of fraudulent concealment, none of the other analysis relevant to the equitable
discovery rule even matters.
Ms. Mower's self-serving declaration, which is the Appellants' sole attempt to
advance any facts in support of a claim that the equitable discovery rule should apply,
falls far short of creating a prim a f acie case of fraudulent concealment. Most of the
declaration is irrelevant to the inquiry; ,r,r 9 and 10 are the only paragraphs that even
remotely address any facts related to fraudulent concealment. In ,r 9, Plaintiffs rely upon
apparent silence of others. In ,r 10, Ms. Mower states that Simpson purportedly
represented one false fact to her. First, a bare assertion that Simpson (an individual that is
neither Dean Mackey nor Kristin Mackey) made one statement to her that she had all of
the land that she paid for does not create a prima facie case for fraudulent concealment.
Also, the Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that, "in no case ... is mere silence or
failure to disclose sufficient in itself to constitute fraudulent concealment." Colosimo,
2007 UT 25, ,r 44. Appellants cannot rely upon a conclusory statement and unsupported
innuendo to demonstrate that she is entitled to equitable tolling of the statutes of
limitations. See Russell/Packard Dev., Inc., 2005 UT 14, ,r 39 (stating that judgment as a
matter of law that a claim is untimely is appropriate when "the facts underlying the
allegation of fraudulent concealment are so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently established
that the claim fails as a matter of law"). Appellants provided no facts to the trial court or
facts from the trial record in their Brief to this Court that justifies anything other than
affirmance of the trial court's determination that the claims were untimely.

10
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B. Appellants cannot seek to use any statement by Mr. Simpson to toll limitations
periods that apply to the Mackeys.
The only basis that Appellants have advanced for tolling of any statute of
limitations period is that Mr. Simpson made a statement to Ms. Mower that was
fraudulent. Utah law does not allow Appellants to rely on such purported facts to toll the
limitations period applicable to their claims against the Mackeys. In Jensen v. IHC
Hospitals, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court recognized that "generally the alleged fraud of
one defendant cannot be imputed to another defendant for tolling purposes." 2003 UT 51,

,I 66, 83 P .3d 107 6. Appellants have not presented any evidence or argument that would
overcome the application of this presumption; therefore, this additional reason also
supports the trial court's dismissal of the Appellants' untimely claims against the
Mackeys.

II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW OF THE CASE.
The trial court correctly applied the law of the case doctrine in detennining that
the Appellants' claims were untimely and dismissing those claims against the Mackeys. 3
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that "a decision made on an issue during one
stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation." Thurston v. Box
Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995) (citing Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 739

3

The Appellants' last paragraph on page 35 of their Brief, which seeks to create some
implication of wrongdoing by the Mackeys, does not even relate to any aspect of any
argument that they have or can make in this appeal. The Mackeys are obligated to
transfer the 12-14 acres based upon the Reconveyance Agreement, which is a contract
that is still in effect and has not been breached. This "part of Plaintiffs' claims" was not
ignored; rather, as very clearly recorded on pages 974-976 of the Record, the claim for
breach of that contract was dismissed.
11
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(Utah 1990)). As explained by the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he doctrine was developed in
the interest of economy and efficiency to avoid the delays and difficulties involved in
repetitious contentions and reconsideration of rulings on matters previously decided in
the same case." Id. (citations omitted). Under this doctrine, "a court is justified in
refusing to reconsider matters it resolved in a prior ruling in the same case for reasons of
efficiency and consistency." Id. at 1038. The policy underlying this doctrine "rests on
good sense and the desire to protect both the court and parties against the burdens of
repeated reargument by indefatigable diehards." Id. at 1039 (quotations and citation
omitted).
Although the Appellants correctly identified the three general reasons for a trial
court to refuse to apply the law of the case to a subsequent decision, the Appellants have
not referenced any intervening change in controlling authority, new evidence, or a clearly
erroneous decision that would justify the trial court's repudiation of the law of the case.
The Appellants refer generally to the trial court's decision to "ignore the court record" as
a basis for their claim that the trial court "abdicated its responsibility to decide the matter
on the merits." (Appellants' Brief at 35.) However, Appellants failed to identify anything
from the record that created any genuine issue of material fact related to any of the
Court's prior rulings (that established the law of the case). Furthennore, Appellants'
position directly contradicts long-standing Utah law that "[a] district court is not obliged
to comb the record to determine whether a genuine issue as to any material fact exists to
prevent summary judgment." Jennings Investment, LC v. Dixie Riding Club, 2009 UT
App 119, ,I 26, 208 P.3d 1077.
12
SLC_2674266.1

The trial court correctly applied the law of the case to the Mackeys' subsequent
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 1132-1133.) The Court's ruling on the Mackeys'
summary judgment motion adequately set forth and explained the grounds (including the
timing, the relevance, the applicability, and the dispositive nature of its previous ruling)
for applying the law of the case, and its application of the law of the case was correct.
The Mackeys relied on the same facts (plus others) that the Simpson Defendants included
in their summary judgment motion, the Appellants' disputes of those facts were equally
as deficient as they had been when the Appellants opposed the Simpson Defendants'
summary judgment motion, and the Court ruled on the undisputed nature of those facts
prior to ruling on the Mackeys' motion. Therefore, the trial court's detennination that
those facts remained undisputed was correct. This Court should affirm the trial court's
dismissal of the claims against the Mackeys as untimely.

III. THE TRIAL COURT'S NON-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GROUNDS
WERE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DISMISSAL OF ALL OF APPELLANTS'
CLAIMS AGAINST THE MACKEYS.

A trial court's judgment may be affirmed "on any ground, even one not relied
upon by the trial court." White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994). So long
as the "rationale for affirming a decision [finds] support in the record," affinnance of the
trial court's judgment is appropriate. Hill v. Seattle First Nat 'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241,246
(Utah 1992). In this case the Court need look no further than the trial court's Ruling on
Mackey Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Order to find several viable
grounds for affirming the trial court's dismissal of claims against the Mackeys. (R. 11261142.)
13
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The trial court relied upon grounds other than law of the case and statute of
limitations when it dismissed the claims against the Mackeys. Additional, substantive
grounds exist to support and uphold the trial court's dismissal of each claim against the
Mackeys. The Appellants overlooked these grounds at the trial court level, and they have
failed to address them again in their Brief.
A. Appellants did not present sufficient evidence to maintain their claim for aiding
and abetting breach offiducia,y duty against the M ackeys.
A plaintiff can pursue a claim against any party that "knowingly join[s] a fiduciary
in fraudulent acts, whereby the fiduciary breaches his or her fiduciary duty."
Russell/Packard Dev., Inc., 2003 UT App 316, ,I 33. As the Russell/Packard Dev. court
noted, "[t]he gravamen of the claim" of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty "is
the defendant's knowing participation in the fiduciary's breach." Id. (citing Future
Group, II v. Nationsbank, 324 S.C. 89,478 S.E. 45 (1996)).
In presenting their case to the trial court,4 Appellants failed to challenge the clear,
undisputed fact that neither Kristin Mackey nor Dean Mackey had any knowledge of any
duty that Mr. Simpson owed to any of the Appellants. Furthermore, they have presented
no evidence that either of the Mackeys knew of any communications that Mr. Simpson
did (or did not) have with Ms. Mower or of any actions that he took that were potentially
adverse to Ms. Mower. Because the Mackeys presented facts that demonstrated the
Appellants' claim for aiding and abetting was deficient, it was Appellants' burden to "set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Stevens v. La Verkin

4

The same deficiency exists in the Appellants' opening Brief.
14
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City, 2008 UT App 129, ~ 18, 183 P .3d 1059. In fact, it was Appellants, as the

nonmoving party, "to demonstrate that such a conflict exists" sufficient to prevent entry
of summary judgment. Jennings Investment, LC, 2009 UT App 119, ~ 26. Because there
is no set of facts that the Appellants ever presented that could satisfy the elements of the
aiding and abetting claim against the Mackeys, the trial court's dismissal of that claim
was proper and should be affirmed.
B. Appellants have presented no basis for overturning the trial court's disniissal of
the unjust enrichment claim. (with its concomitant equitable lien and constructive
trust remedy claims) against the M ackeys.

Utah law has long been clear that "the right to contract freely on terms which
establish and allocate risks between the contracting parties" is "fundamental" and that no
court may "assume the paternalistic role of declaring that one who has freely bound
himself need not perform because the bargain is not favorable." Res. Mgmt. Co. v.
Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1040 (Utah 1985). Therefore, a

plaintiff may only pursue an unjust enriclunent claim if that plaintiff can demonstrate that
"a person has and retains money or benefits that injustice and equity belong to another."
Hess v. Johnston, 2007 UT App 213, ~ 20, 163 P.3d 747. Simply identifying "the fact

that a person benefits another" is not sufficient basis "to require the other to make
restitution." Id.
Appellants do not dispute that the Mackeys granted a Right of Use Easement and
also contracted to transfer up to 14 acres as part of the overall transaction that secured the
land for Ms. Mower's ranch. Rather, Appellants claim that the transaction could have
been transacted differently, so the value that the Mackeys provided should not be
15
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considered legitimate. First, this argument flies in the face of Utah's very clear precedent
that the parties, not courts, decide what terms are to be included in a bargain. Second, the
argument fails because the Mackeys did provide consideration in exchange for the
property transfers (and did not receive "a true windfall or 'something for nothing"').

Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315, iJ 29,222 P.3d 69. Third, this argument is
logically inconsistent, given that the Appellants are still, to this day, relying upon the
enforcement of the contract that Ms. Mackey signed to transfer the 12-14 acres.
Appellants cannot claim that the Mackeys provided no consideration for the property
transfer and, at the same time, insist that the Mackeys' obligation to transfer 12-14 acres
is still a viable obligation.
Appellants cannot escape the clear, undisputed fact that the Mackeys provided
value in exchange for the Storrs and Olsen parcels of property. Appellants' attempt to
minimize the value through a speculative and qualitative explanation of the purported
unnecessary nature of the Mackeys' involvement is inappropriate and does not follow
Utah's clear law regarding parties' ability to contract amongst themselves. Appellants
cannot satisfy the elements of a claim for unjust enrichment, and they have not even
attempted to present facts that demonstrate their entitlement to continue to pursue this
claim against the Mackeys. The Court's dismissal of this claim should be affirmed.
Finally, Appellants have no basis to claim that they are entitled to equitable relief
through the creation of a constructive trust or through the imposition of an equitable lien.
Utah law is clear that both of those "claims" are remedial and derivative in nature and
have no independent viability. See Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2010 UT 52, iJ 16, 240 P.3d
16
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754; D.U. Co., Inc. v. Jenkins, 2009 UT App 195, ~ 4,216 P.3d 360. Because the unjust
enrichment claim was appropriately dismissed, the Appellants' request for constructive
trust and equitable lien also were appropriately denied by the trial court.
C. Appellants have never been able to support a conspiracy claim against the
Mackeys.

Any party seeking to pursue and prove a claim for conspiracy faces a very high set
of hurdles. First, five elements must be shown: "( 1) a combination of two or more
persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or
course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate
result thereof." Alta Indus. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1290 n.17 (Utah 1993) (citation
omitted). Also, a plaintiff has the burden of presenting "clear and convincing evidence
supporting his conspiracy theory." Israel Pagan Est. v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 793 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987). Moreover, "[t]his evidence must do more than merely raise a suspicionit must lead to belief that the conspiracy existed." Id. "Evidence is insufficient if it
discloses acts just as consistent with a lawful purpose as with an unlawful one. Common
sense and reason dictate that evil inferences should not be permitted to be drawn from
routine business transactions where there are no other transactions. To hold otherwise
would throw the door open for an attack on each and every transaction that one might
enter into." Id. (citations omitted). Finally, "[t]o assert civil conspiracy, plaintiff must
also prove that the alleged conspirators performed one or more unlawful, overt acts."
Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56, ,I 12, 42 P.3d 1253 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).

17
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The Appellants never presented evidence to support any of the elements of
conspiracy. They failed to present evidence of a combination, an object, or a meeting of
the minds on that object between the Mackeys and Mr. Simpson and his entities. The
only evidence ever presented by any party was that these property transactions were done
at arm's length. Also, the Appellants never identified any unlawful, overt act or any
damages that they suffered.
Simply put, the Mackeys did not engage in any illegal transactions. Also, Plaintiffs
have not (and cannot) articulate damages that they allegedly suffered. The Mackeys
engaged in legal land transactions with Simpson and his entities to compile enough land
to meet zoning requirements to build a residence. This included an exchange of an
easement and a contract to give land to Wood Springs, LLC. In return, the Mackeys
acquired the Storrs and Olsen properties. These were legal transactions with no actual
proof of fraud or illegal means. Additionally, the Plaintiffs benefited from these
transactions and suffered no damages; through these transactions, Ms. Mower gained
enough contiguous property to build the equestrian center.
Appellants cannot claim that the trial court erroneous Iy dismissed their claim for
conspiracy when they have not presented (and cannot present) any evidence, let alone
evidence that would satisfy a clear and convincing evidence threshold, to support the
elements of a conspiracy claim. Appellants have simply ignored their evidentiary burdens
at the trial court level and have failed to address those burdens in their Brief. Because a
valid basis exists for the trial court's dismissal of Appellants' conspiracy claim, the trial
court should be affirmed.
18
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CONCLUSION

Appellants' attempts to reverse the trial court's summary adjudication of their
claims fail. The trial court con-ectly applied the statutes of limitations and the law of the
case to Appellants' claims. The claims were both untimely and factually deficient, and
this Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the claims asserted against the
Mackeys. The Mackeys respectfully request that it do so.
th

DATED this 24 day of February 2016.

Aaron
Counsel for the Mackeys
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